PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS

A Journal of Comparative Politics

The Political Regulation of National and Ethnic Conflict

BY JOHN McGARRY AND BRENDAN O'LEARY

NATIONAL and ethnic conflict has been a persistent feature of modernity but the last few years have brought seismic changes in the relations between several ethnic communities around the world. The disintegrations of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have led to multiple ethnic wars. In South Africa, apartheid, the world's most infamous system of ethnic domination, appears to be on the verge of extinction, while a new system of domination has been established in Fiji. Elsewhere, the Czechs and Slovaks have snapped the hyphen which held their fragile federation together, and India seems poised on the brink of catastrophic communal conflict sparked by the rise of Hindu fundamentalism. In Canade, Cyprus, Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland the principal protagonists are engaged in negotiations about their political future or in 'negotiations about negotiations'. The times are especially appropriate for examining the ways in which national and ethnic conflicts might be politically regulated. This article develops a taxonomy of the macro-political methods of national and ethic conflict regulation. We also briefly explain the circumstances under which particular strategies for managing such conflict are attempted; and we evaluate the normative merits of the different forms of conflict regulation from a liberal-democratic perspective.

Eight distinct macro-methods of conflict regulation are distinguishable, to wit: (i) genocide; (ii) forced mass population transfers; (iii) partition and/or secession (self-determination); (iv) integration and/or assimilation; (v) hegemonic control; (vi) arbitration (third-party intervention); (vii) cantonisation/federalism; and (viii) consociationalism. This taxonomy suggests neither discreteness nor exhaustiveness. Often the eight strategies are mixed and targeted at the same ethnic group(s), or alternatively, different strategies are aimed at different ethnic groups within the same state. Oliver Cromwell offered Irish Catholics a choice between genocide and forced mass population transfer: they could go 'To Hell or Connaught'! Stalin used genocide, forced mass population transfers and coercive assimilation to manage Soviet ethnic conflict. Belgium has practised consociationalism to regulate divisions between its 'spiritual families' and federalism to resolve tensions between its linguistic communities.

Our taxonomy is divisible according to the goals of political agents.

The first four (genocide, mass population transfers, partition/secession and integration/assimilation) generally aim to eliminate ethnic or national differences, while the last four aim to manage differences (hegemonic control, arbitration, cantonisation/federalism, and consociation). It is not, in our opinion, either plausible or desirable to say which of these two approaches is inherently superior. Of the eliminating-differences strategies, there are moral justifications for partition (or secession) and integration (assimilation) which have been advanced by generations of liberals and socialists. However, there is no obvious moral hierachy which enables people to claim that integration is better than partition or vice versa, unless there is widespread consent among the relevant ethnic communities for one option rather than the other. The merits of partition (or secession) as against integration (or assimilation) must be decided by political argument and pragmatic considerations, such as feasibility and estimates about long-run efficacy. There is nothing moral about genocide or forced mass population transfers, the other difference-eliminating stategies, although 'ethical' arguments have usually accompanied their implementation. Of the managing-differences strategies, only hegemonic control should be morally unacceptable to liberals and democrats (see below). The rest (arbitration, cantonisation/federalism and consociationalism) are fully compatible with democratic norms. Support for them must, however, be tempered by empirical judgements about their feasibility and long-term efficacy.

Eliminating ethnic or national differences

GENOCIDE

Genocide, literally the killing of a race or kind ($\gamma \varepsilon \nu o \sigma$), is a controversial term. Article II of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines it as 'acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such'; and its sub-clauses include '(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring out its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposng measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group'. Much conceptual and moral controversy surround the definition of genocide but for our purposes genocide is the deliberate mass killing of a group (national, ethnic, linguistic or religious) in a territory controlled by the killers.[1]

Such genocides have been perpetrated throughout history. Native groups throughout the Americas were the victims of genocide at the hands of European colonisers. Genocides were committed by the Nazis and their allies in the 1940s, by the Turks against the Armenians, and within the Communist bloc in Eurasia. Since 1945 there have been genocides perpetrated in Burundi (of Hutu); in Iraq (of the Kurds); in

Indonesia (of the Chinese and the indigenous population of East Timor); in Nigeria (of Ibo residents in the North); in Pakistan (of the Bengalis in what became Bangladesh); in Uganda (of the Acholi, the Lango, the Bagandans and the Nilotic tribes) and in Burma (of Muslims in border regions).

Genocides are intended to terminate national and ethnic conflict, and they often succeed in securing the relevant territories for imperial rulers. Yet genocides often fail to achieve their objectives, and always create explosive and historically entrenched bitterness and fear amongst the descendants of victims. After nearly eighty years, the Armenians are still the bitter enemies of the Turks. Serb-Croat relations in what was Yugoslavia are inflamed by memories of war-time genocide during World War II. Serb-Muslim relations in Bosnia have been irreparably damaged for the foreseeable future by the recent atrocities. If Russians and indigenous groups in the Baltic states, Ukraine and Kazakhstan are to coexist peacefully, many skeletons will have to remain buried.

It is possible to identify when and where genocide is likely to be contemplated. *State-genocide* is more likely to occur when: an empire is being contructed and maintained, where genocide is used as a deliberate policy of land acquisition and mass terrorisation, or to exact revenge upon a rebellious population (e.g. the conquest of the 'New World'); an ethnic community lacks geopolitical resources (its own state or a powerful diaspora); a subordinate ethnic community lacks geopolitical resources (its own state or a powerful diaspora); a subordinate ethnic community is left vulnerable within a disintegrating system of control (e.g. Armenians in Turkey); a given ethnic community (e.g. Jews, Ibos, Armenians, overseas Chinese) possesses economic superiority and cultural identifiability in conditions of industrialisation, but lacks military and political power[2]; and when a totalitarian state is established with a hegemonic ideology which demonises and scapegoats a section of the population (e.g. Jews).

'*Frontier genocide*', which, by contrast, may not be directly implemented by public officials, is likely to occur when settlers, possessed of technologically superior resources, displace natives from their access to land. It is a concomitant of colonisation and conquest.

A necessary condition for genocide appears to be the presence of an ethnic, racial or religious ideology which sanctions a non-universalist conception of the human species, and makes mass murder easier to accomplish. These belief systems may be more important than technological capacities for managing mass killings, as it is the discipline of the killers, rather than their instruments, which may best account for the scale of genocides. Genocides can be instrumental and 'pre-emptive' as well as being ideological: indigenous peoples were killed by European colonisers on the supposition that their circumstances were those of 'kill or be killed'. The same beliefs seem to have been important in motivating Tutsi genocides of Hutu in Burundi.

FORCED MASS POPULATION TRANSFERS

Forced mass population transfers occur where an ethnic community (or a set of communities) is compelled to leave its home. The Serbian term 'ethnic cleansing' brutally expresses the objective. Forced mass population transfers have been applied to those living in their ancestral homelands, as well as to recently settled immigrants. The target communities can be evicted from the state's territory or transferred internally. They can also be shifted internally under the guise of being 'repatriated', as happened under South Africa's so-called 'homelands' policy'.

Forced mass population transfers must be disinguished from three other types of population movement which appear outwardly similar. They are different from agreed 'population exchanges' which accompany partitions (such as those between Greece and Turkey after the end of World War I. The populations involved in 'agreed exchanges' never consider such moves to be voluntary, but their fate can be distinguished from those unilaterally compelled to move. Second, forced population transfers imply premeditated acts of policy and can be distinguished from involuntary movements of refugees which are by-products of wars and civil wars. Third, forced transfers involve the physical expulsion of an ethnic group and can be distinguised from policies which, by creating an inhospitable environment for dominated groups, result in their disproportionate emigration. The latter policies are associated with hegemonic control which we discuss below. There is also a question of scale involved in mass population transfers, and they should be distinguished from the expulsion of individuals or small groups. However, 'induced' transformations of demographic balances are the functional equivalents of mass population transfers. The deliberate importing of settlers into a territory to dilute the strength of a compact and contiguous community, i.e. settler colonialism, has similar consequences, although it is best seen as a form of hegemonic control.

Planned mass transfers of peoples against their will have been widespread in history. British imperial authorities, and their American counterparts, forced North American natives off their ancestral lands and onto reservations throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries. Stalin routinely shuffled around national and ethnic groups in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and 1940s. Jews were the victims of forced population transfers under the Nazis (and even earlier under the Romans). Several ethnic groups in eastern Europe, including Germans in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic region, were forced to relocate in the aftermath of the Second World war. In the 1970s, the Turkish Army expelled Greek Cypriots from northern Cyprus and Idi Amin drove the Asian community from Uganda. In the former Yugoslavia, the republics of Bosnia and Croatia have been scenes of forced popu-

lation transfers. In western Europe, fascist parties want to expel or 'repatriate' refugees and 'guest-workers'.

As a policy instrument, forced population transfers may be designed to achieve a variety of ends. Like genocides, they are often advocated as integral components of imperial consolidation strategies. They can be designed to punish rebels and set examples 'pour encourager les autres', as with Cromwell's 'transplantation' strategies in Ireland, or they can form part of a defence policy against an external attack, as with Stalin's movement of the Volga Germans during World War II. Forced population transfers which accompany war or civil wars are often designed to establish demographic facts to strengthen territorial claims: consider the expulsion of Greek Cypriots from northern Cyprus in 1974 and the expulsion of Muslims from large chunks of Bosnia in 1992–93. Expulsions of groups may also be motivated by an acquisitive desire for their resources, as in the case of the eviction of Uganda's Asians or North American Indians. Alternatively, immigrant groups and temporary workers may be expelled during economic recessions when there are not enough jobs to go around. South Africa's "homelands' policy", by allowing the government to argue that many of the country's large black majority were citizens of other states, was a crude attempt to deflect international criticism of apartheid.

Forced population transfers may displace but do not always terminate national or ethnic conflict. Current outrages in the northern Caucasus can be traced directly to Stalin's displacements of peoples, some of whom have returned to reclaim their homes. One obstacle to a peace settlement in Cyprus is the demand of expelled Greek-Cypriots to have their land back. 'Ethnic cleansing' in the former Yugoslavia has added to the stockpile of historic grievances which exist there. There are no moral merits to forced mass population transfers. They violate any minimalist conceptions of human rights and any egalitarian political philosophies.

PARTITION & SECESSION (SELF-DETERMINATION)

By contrast with genocide and forced mass population transfers, partition and/or secession can, in principle, respect the right of national and ethnic communities to enjoy 'self determination'. Partitions resolve national and ethnic conflict, if they work, by the principle of divorce. They can be executed in three different ways: by the core of the relevant state, e.g. when the United Kingdom in effect decided how much of Ireland would be permitted to secede between 1920 and 1925; by the agreement of the divorcing parties, e.g. the break-up of Czecho-Slovakia proceeded with the agreement of the Czech and Slovak governments (but without the support of the Hungarians of Slovakia); by external imposition, e.g. the dismemberment of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires by the victorious allies after World War I.

Secessionists aspire to independent statehood, as with Slovak, Scots,

Ukrainian, and Quebecois nationalists; while 'semi-secessionists' aspire to be linked to another state, as with Bosnian Serbs, Northern Irish nationalists, and possibly the Hungarians of Slovakia. Secessions normally involve the breakaway of minorities, but they can involve the bulk of the state's population as with Russia's secession from the Soviet Union in 1991 (the Yelstin option). In the years between 1948 and 1991 only one new state, Bangladesh, was carved out of an existing state, if we exclude the numerous cases of decolonisation of European and US controlled territories in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the unrecognised (except by Turkey) secession of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1981. However, since the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union secession has become a growth industry, the in-vogue method of national and ethnic conflict resolution. Czechs and Slovaks joined the bandwagon in early 1993; Eritrea will do so soon. There are multiple secessionist movements around the world, in Europe, Canada, the Commonwealth of Independent States, in Africa, and in central and south Asia.

Many secessions can and are justified as ways of escaping oppression and achieving freedom and self-government. However, the key problem with the principle of self-determination taking the form of secession as a means of eliminating national and ethnic conflict is that it begs four questions: who are the people; what is the relevant territorial unit in which they should exercise self-determination; what constitutes a majority; does secession produce a domino effect in which minorities within seceding territories will seek self-determination for themselves?

In what were Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union these questions, far from being academic, have led to multiple civil wars. There are many other hard cases in seeking to apply the doctrine of self-determination. In Transylvania there are two major populations (Hungarians and Romanians) mixed together in the same region along with other smaller communities. In Quebec, aboriginal Canadians are unwilling to secede from Canade with the Francophone majority. In the Punjab and Kashmir, Hindus vehemently oppose the very idea of secession. In Slovakia, the significant Hungarian minority fears that the break-up of Czecho-Slovakia will be detrimental to their interests.

The constitution of a majority for self-determination begs the question of a majority in what region? As Ivor Jennings cynically remarked of the principle of self-determination, on the surface it seems reasonable: let the people decide, it is in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people[3]. Exercising the principle of self-determination is only straightforward where there is no large or disgruntled minority within the relevant region affected by the proposed secession *and* when the seceding area includes the great majority of those who wish to leave. Unfortunately, it is difficult to think of instances where these optimum conditions have applied. Norway's secession from Sweden, and Iceland's from Denmark were

exemplary cases. So was Slovenia's secession from Yugoslavia. However, the partitions of Ireland and India left significant minorities behind in Northern Ireland and Kashmir; and those who celebrated the exercise of self-determination in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union have tempered their enthusiasm in the light of the ethnic time-bombs left behind.

With the collapse of the global cold war, there is now much greater room for successful secession and the alteration of borders artificially frozen by the strategic interests of the superpowers, as the reunification of Germany suggests. 'Globalisation' and the increasing power of regional supra-state organisations, may also make some state boundaries less inviolate. However, secession remains an option very likely to produce violence, and problems (initially) as bad as the ones it is intended to solve. Whether or not implementing secession is straightforward, the proposal of any community to secede from a state is likely to encourage key elites in the affected states to behave in chauvinistic and warlike ways. Secessionist movements provoke elites satisfied with the existing state into mobilising 'unionist' movements against traitors. It was ironic to watch American commentators warning the Soviet Union during 1990–91 to allow its republics the right to self-determination. Lincoln's heirs had short memories.

What can be said of a general nature about the circumstances under which secession/partitions are likely to be carried out? Three external phenomena matter most and need to be studied closely: the nature of the inter-state system (is it permissive or restrictive?); the aftermath of wars, which often lead to territorial transfers/partitions, often without any consideration of consent; and the disintegration of empires, although this observation is almost tautological.

The important 'internal' phenomena are diverse. People seek full self-determination, in the form of independent statehood, for a variety of reasons. The urge may be motivated by a reaction against ethnic discrimination and humiliation, by the pragmatic expectation that the new nation-state will have greater economic and political freedom, by the desire for power and prestige amongst nationalist elites, or to protect a given culture from extinction. Not much of a very general nature can be successfully claimed about the economic circumstances or motivations of full-scale ethnic secessionist movements. One observer notes that secessions are demanded both by economically advanced groups (e.g. Basques, Catalans, Ibos, Lombards, Sikhs, Tamils) and by economically backward communities (East Bengalis, Karens, Kurds, Slovaks); and that the secessionist communities can be located in either backward or advanced regional economies[4]. He claims, however, that backward communities in backward regions are likely to be early rather than late secessionists. Yet even this generalisation, derived from intimate knowledge of African and South Asia, does not withstand the scrutiny of the immediate past. In both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia the economically advanced communities in economically advanced regions (in the Baltic states and Slovenia and Croatia) led the secessionist vanguard.

Most importantly, enthusiasm for the principle of self-determination flows from the democratisation of the world. Democratisation means that the people are to rule. The statist declares that the people are all those who are resident in a given state or political unit's boundaries (the civic nationalist); the nationalist that they are the nation (the ethnic nationalist). In a few happy cases—e.g. Iceland—these two answers approximately coincide. In most, however, the two definitions of the people do not coincide. In the general case the definition and championing of the people are up for grabs, and the possibility of partition/secession enters into the fabric of any state where ethnic and civic nationalisms may point to different definitions of the nation.

Once democratisation poses the issue of the definition of the people, a clustered set of issues automatically follows. The most important issues are the definition of citizenship, the possession of the franchise, the state's boundaries and the organisational structure of the state. These issues create incentive for political entrepreneurs to build organised interests out of ethnic cleavages, whether at the foundation of the state or afterwards. Politicians in polyethnic states have multiple inducements to play the national or ethic card, whether it be Randolph Churchill playing the Orange card in the UK in the 1880s or Jean-Marie Le Pen playing the Algerian card in France in the 1980s. It does not seem possible to immunise the democratic process to exclude potentially explosive civic and ethnic issues. They are always there for mobilisation by the oppressed or the opportunist (internal and external) or both. Those who lose out politically under existing state-structures and public policies may always choose to redefine the rules of the game by playing the national or ethnic card in the arena of party politics.

A final reason why national and ethnic questions are potentially explosive and raise the possibility that some people(s) will be tempted to exercise self-determination through secession is simple. National and ethnic questions raise relatively non-tradable issues. Nationality and ethnicity (and their potential building blocks, like language, territorial homelands, and historic cultures) are not easily bargained over. They create zero-sum conflicts and therefore provide ideal materials for political entrepreneurs interested in creating or dividing political constituencies.

Having suggested reasons why democratisation increases the likelihood that political actors will seek self-determination for their community and thereby destabilise existing multi-national or polyethnic states, we must make two qualifications. First, destabilisation is likely to be contained if the relevant state or region exists in a milieu or other liberal democratic states. Thus far, in the twentieth century, liberal democracies have never gone to war against one another. Second, there are some circumstances under which the destabilising effects of democratisation

upon multi-national or polyethnic states can be muted, and inhibit the impetus to consider secession. These factors include: internal territorial segregation which permits self-government ('good fences make good neighbours'); demographic dominance (where the large group is sufficiently secure not to fear the minority, or minorities, and behaves in a generous way); demographic stability (where one or more groups are not outgrowing or 'outfalling' one another); and a history of pre-democratic cooperation amongst ethnic political elites which gives the post-authoritarian state a reasonable chance of promoting accommodation.

INTEGRATION/ASSIMILATION

A fourth method of macro-political conflict regulation is built upon the idea of trying to eliminate politically relevant differences within the state by seeking to integrate or assimilate the relevant communities into a new transcendent identity, through 'nation-building'. Whereas civic integration has the more modest object of creating a common civic, national or patriotic identity and citizenship; assimilation aims eventually to create a common ethnic identity through the merging of differences (the melting pot). Where one community adopts the culture of the 'host' or dominant community, we can speak of assimilation through 'acculturation'.

Integration has been the official aspiration of many groups including the African National Congress in South Africa, unionist integrationists and the integrated education lobby in Northern Ireland, and the democratic left in those European countries striving to cope with immigrant influxes. Though inconceivable a few years ago, integration has been embraced by pragmatists in South Africa's National Party who believe that the ecoomic status quo can be secured and improved through liberal democracy, with its protection of individual rights, better than under apartheid.

Integrationists favour policies which reduce the differences between communities, ensuring that the children of the (potentially rival) communities go to the same schools, socialising them in the same language and conventions, encouraging public and private housing policies which prevent segregation, and seeing that the work-place is integrated by outlawing discrimination. Liberal integrationists promote Bills of Rights with equal rights for individuals, rather than communities. Leftist integrationists stress socio-economic policies with trans-ethnic appeal. Assimilationist policies go further. They favour the merging of ethnic identities, either into one already established identity (e.g. a French identity) or into a new one (e.g. a Soviet or Yugoslav identity). Integrationists and assimilationists also support 'catch-all' political parties, ones with trans-ethnic appeals. The ultimate proof of successful assimilation is large-scale intermarriage across the former ethnic boundaries which leads first to their blurring and then to their eradication[5].

Integration and assimilation are driven by both high-minded and instrumental motives. Liberals and socialists associate ethnic pluralism, what we call strategies for the democratic management of national and ethnic differences, with sectarianism, parochialism, narrow-mindedness and chauvinist bigotry. Liberal assimilationists often reject 'special treatment' for ethnic groups as offensive to the 'merit' principle. Canadian integrationists demanded a Charter of Rights after 1945 to prevent a repeat of the war-time internment of ethnic minorities (Japanese, Italians and Ukrainians). White liberals in the USA funded court cases promoting black integration. Other liberals in North America sincerely advocate the assimilation of aboriginal minorities as the best way to end the atrocious conditions on reservations. European socialists struggled to overcome ethnic differences at the turn of the century, because they regarded them as bourgeois devices to impoverish and disorganise the working class. Today, the European left generally espouses the integration of immigrants because it abhors racism and discrimination.

However, sometimes integrationism is not so high-minded: in Northern Ireland those who advocate integration of all as either British or Irish citizens are merely interested in pursuing their own nationalist agenda; while in South Africa some of those who advocate integration are either interested in preserving their economic privileges (whites) or they see it as a way of establishing majority control (blacks). Sometimes, integrationism is not even accompanied by formal generosity—consider white Canadians or white Britons who rail against the idea of Sikhs being allowed to wear their turbans where others would not be permitted to do so. For many integrationists the 'merit' principle is a thinly veiled code for maintaining their privileged position under the status quo, and 'equal citizenship' becomes a code for advocating 'majority rule', including whatever direct or indirect discriminatory practices underwrite the status quo and the position of the majority[6].

The targets of integrationist or assimilationist policies respond in various ways—partly as a function of their perceptions of the motives lying behind the policies. Such policies are often targeted at migrants in liberal democratic states. In Canada, the Anglophone community and, to a lesser extent, the Francophone community in Quebec, have been reasonably successful in assimilating immigrants. They have acquired a Canadian civic identity alongside their original ethnic identity. Similarly, 'New Australians' have emerged in the wake of post-war continental European migrations. But these cases of moderately successful integrations or assimilations involved migrations to a 'new' country, where the migrants, in principle, were willing to adapt their cultures to their new host country and accept a new civic identity.

Where ethnic communities seek more than equal opportunity and insist on autonomy or self-government, integrationist or assimilationist policies fall on stonier ground. Communities living in their ancestral

territories, for example, are often less willing than individual migrants to shed their culture or accept some new overarching identity. In Canada, aboriginal Americans resist assimilation and hold out for varying degrees of self-government. They call themselves 'first nations' to stress the moral superiority of their claims to cultural protection.

While examples of successful assimilation within and across historic homelands are not unheard of, they are unusual; if one community's language, culture, religion and national myths are given precedence, then the subordinate groups feel they are being annexed rather than assimilated or integrated. In such cases people complain of 'ethnocide', the destruction of their culture as opposed to their physical liquidation. This complaint is the standard one raised by the indigenous peoples of the world. They are right to insist that some forms of integration and assimilation are coercive. Making peasants into French people in the nineteenth-century, the schooling of black South Africans in Afrikaans, the 'Russification' practised by the Czars and the CPSU, the 'Bulgarization' of ethnic Turks, the 'Turkicisation' of ethnic Kurds, the 'Magyarization' of Hungary's Slovak minority, the 'Polonization' of Jewish, German and Byelorussian minorities in the 1920s, the periodic attempts at 'Anglicisation' of French Canada in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the 'Romanisation' implemented by Ceaucescu in Transylvania, are policies cut from the same cloth.

Even arguably more neutral strategies of integration or assimilation encounter significant resistance, as with Nehruvian secularism in India, or Yugoslav and Soviet communism. These efforts to establish transcendent or pan-ethnic identities were often seen by minorities as disguised forms of cultural annexation, although the same policies were frequently rejected by the relevant dominant communities which saw them as detrimental to their Hindu, Serbian or Russian cultures. In South Africa, integrationism faces opposition among the white minority, some of whom see it leading inevitably to black majority rule; but is also rejected by many blacks, who see it as a crude device for maintaining white minority privileges.

Those who regard assimilationist or integrationist strategies as benign forms of conflict regulation in contested homelands underestimate the difficulties involved. Optimistic observers of South Africa need to be counselled that it will be some time before representative Afrikaners and blacks embrace the ANC and the National Party respectively. In the foreseeable future Basques, Croats, Bosnians, Serbs and Northern Ireland Catholics and Protestants are unlikely to be integrated or assimilated with their ethnic enemies. In fact, resistance to unwanted assimilation or integration is likely to be very high, and can provoke ethnic revivals and secessionism in response, as has occurred in Burma, Ghana and Uganda[7].

For these reasons, amongst others, many liberal democracies which are managing large-scale immigrations, or multiple recently established

ethnic communities, have realised that multi-cultural policies make greater sense than straightforward integrationist or assimilationist strategies. They are abandoning the spirit of classical liberalism to manage immigrants. In the UK and France, at least in previous generations, liberals had a general bias towards integration or assimilation as macro-political forms of national and ethnic conflict resolution, at least within the metropolitan cores of their empires. However, this strategy seeks to resolve ethnic conflict by eliminating differences when the relevant problem is the desire of members of ethnic communities to maintain those differences. Liberals committed to the right of individuals to choose their own conceptions of the good find it hard to argue against allowing people to choose to preserve their traditions. This difficulty leads to a normative division of opinion between liberal integrationists (who are accused of intolerance) and liberal multi-culturalists (who are accused of surrendering liberalism to a form of relativism which tolerates illiberalism, e.g. in the form of Muslim schools). Liberal multi-culturalists now see the merits of ways of resolving ethnic conflict which rely on managing differences rather than eliminating them[8].

Political engineers seeking to resolve ethnic conflict also frequently recommend the development of catch-all political parties to break down the salience of ethnic cleavages, i.e. they advocate electoral integration. For example, the absence of Great Britain's political parties in Nothern Ireland before 1989 led one enthusiast for electoral integration to make the remarkable claim that the British party boycott was 'the fundamental reason' for continuing conflict in the region[9]. Those persuaded of the merits of engineering electoral integration include the military framers of Nigeria's second constitution, which forced political parties to develop some support in all regions of the state. Such electoral integrationist projects may be well-intentioned ways of regulating conflict, but they are mostly based on wishful thinking. If there are parties which already mobilise across ethnic divisions, then political stability is indeed likely to be greater, but the belief that one can generate parties with such effects through heroic acts of will is fundamentally utopian, especially if the relevant communities have already been mobilised behind different conceptions of nationalism.

Managing ethnic or national differences

HEGEMONIC CONTROL

The most common system of managing as opposed to eliminating conflict in multi-national or polyethnic or bi-ethnic states is that of 'hegemonic control'. Imperial or authoritarian regimes controlled multiple cultures within their territories through coercive domination and elite co-option.[10] They suppressed latent divisions between ethnic communities which might otherwise have been manifested, especially in conditions of economic modernisation. Control is hegemonic if it makes

an overtly violent ethnic or national contest for state power either 'unthinkable' or 'unworkable' for subordinated communities. Ethnically based slave-systems were exemplary cases of authoritarian hegemonic control. Hegemonic control in imperial or authoritarian regimes need not have, although it often did, rest on the support of the largest or most powerful ethnic community. What was necessary was control of the relevant coercive apparatuses: thus ethnic minorities in Fiji (after 1987), and South Africa (until 1990–1) were able to sustain hegemonic control because of their control over security and policing systems.

In liberal democracies hegemonic control appears less feasible than in authoritarian regimes. Liberal democracies with statist conceptions of citizenship permit, indeed facilitate, nationalist or ethnic organisation and mobilisation; and ethnic contests for state power become eminently 'thinkable' and 'workable' within liberal democratic or open institutions. Think of how Irish nationalism was facilitated by the democratisation of the United Kingdom, or of how nationalism was encouraged by glasnost in the Soviet Union. Similarly, the breakdown of the Franco regime in Spain after 1975 facilitated nationalist challenges to the Spanish state, although of a less severe variety. The liberal optimist might therefore conclude that democratisation spells doom to systems of hegemonic control.

However, systems of hegemonic control, or ethnic domination, can be constructed in formally liberal democratic states. The most obvious method is when formally liberal democratic institutions are monopolised by a minority of the state's population, as in South Africa and Rhodesia. But hegemonic control can occur in states in which the majority or entirety of the relevant state's adult population has formal access to citizenship. Democracy in its most primitive meaning is understood as 'majority-rule'. Where political 'majorities' constantly fluctuate, as people change their minds on the key policy or political issues of the day, then majority-rule is a sensible decision-rule. However, where there are two or more deeply established national or ethnic communities, and where the members of these communities do not agree on the basic institutions and policies the regime should pursue, then majority-rule can become an instrument of hegemonic control.

Northern Ireland (1920–72) is an example of a region within a liberal democratic state where formal majoritarianism co-existed with hegemonic control over the relevant minority[11]. The unionist majority monopolised the police, para-statal and judicial systems, manipulated the franchise to consolidate its domination, practised economic discrimination in employment and the allocation of public housing, institutional discrimination against the minority's cultural and educational systems, and repressed minority-discontent. The Canadian state practised control over aboriginal groups. Natives were policed through the white judicial system, denied certain privileges if they left reservations and the (federal) franchise if they remained on them (until 1961). In

India, the demands of Sikhs for an autonomous Punjab partly arise from their fear that Nehruvian tolerance has increasingly given way to Hindu chauvinism, presaging a move towards control as the preferred Hindu method of governing India.

Some maintain that systems of hegemonic control can be normatively defensible. Ian Lustick maintains, for example, that control is often the only alternative to continuous war[12]. However, this quasi-Hobbesian reasoning (any state is better than none) is suspect. The options in any given national or ethnic conflict are rarely simply between those of control and continuous war—although there will be plenty of political entrepreneurs seeking to advance precisely this argument. Some of the alternative options we discuss below (federalism/cantonisation, arbitration and consociationalism) have some record of success in stabilising deeply divided societies in ways which are compatible with liberal democratic norms, whereas any system of control is easily convertible into a system for the execution of genocide, ethnocide, forced mass population transfers and other violations of human rights. Furthermore, partitionist or secessionist options are almost invariably more desirable than the imposition of control. If the relevant partition or secession is even moderately well executed, it should ensure that more people can enjoy legitimate self-government than would be the case under a system of control. In any case, under systems of control the subordinated minority will always seek to 'internationalise' its plight under the relevant hegemonic group (or party or dictator) and thereby threaten the stability of the relevant regime as well as the international order. Therefore one can use stability-arguments which are the converse of Lustick's. Finally, if a system of control eventually breaks down, its practices will simply have added to the accumulated stock of ethnic grievances. Repression sidelines moderates, bolsters extremists and obstructs prospects for future accommodation, as in the Punjab and Northern Ireland for example. One might also argue in a realist fashion, although the evidence would need careful appraisal, that wars may sort matters out more successfully than exercising hegemonic control and even create incentives for post-war co-operation.

ARBITRATION OF BENIGN THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION

Arbitration of multi-national or polyethnic states is the least recognised strategy in the literature on conflict regulation. The neglect may partly be caused by the problem of deciding what exactly is arbitration. The main classificaton difficulty is whether to treat any conflict regulating activity which is the outcome of third-party intervention as arbitration, or to confine the term arbitration to cases where the relevant third-party intervention is characterised by procedural neutrality of some kind. Our preference is for the latter more exclusive usage. Many third-party interventions, as we shall see, are indistinguishable from efforts to establish control of a given region.

Arbitration entails the intervention of a neutral, bipartisan or multi-partisan authority. It differs from other methods used to stabilise antagonistic societies because it involves conflict regulation by agents other than the directly contending parties. The disinterestedness of the arbiter makes it possible for this person (or institution, or state) to win the acquiescence, if not the enthusiastic support, of the contending national or ethnic segments and thereby dampen the violence which would otherwise occur. Arbitration is distinguishable from *mediation* because the arbiter makes the relevant decisions, whereas mediators merely facilitate them. Thus from 1991 the EC and then the inter-national community through the offices of Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen were mediating rather than arbitrating in what was Yugoslavia.

In a system of arbitration the role of the arbiter is portrayed like that of conciliator presiding over a family quarrel. Arbiters pursue the common interests of the rival segments in the relevant society as they perceive them; regulate the political exchanges between the segments as umpires (to prevent a further and more dramatic breakdown in state order); and preside over ethnic elites who have varying incentives to engage in responsible and cooperative behaviour. Arbitration, in principle, can establish the conditions for longer-term democratic conflict resolution: secessions, partitions, power-sharing or even the peaceful integration or assimilation of the rival communities. But third-party interventionists can play the role of self-appointed arbiters and act to reconstruct the old system of ethnic control—as for example occurred when a Russian Czar handed back Hungary to Habsburg control in 1849, or when the British empire handed Northern Ireland to the Ulster Unionist Party. Alternatively self-appointed arbiters can presage the creation of a new system of control by handing power to a different ethnic segment(s). Arbitration of national or ethnic conflicts is of two broad types, the internal and the external, each of which can be performed by different kinds of agents.

Internal arbitration can be executed by an individual who is not a member of the main antagonistic ethnic communities: for example Julius Nyrere in post-independence Tanzania. It can be fulfilled by statesmen with the moral authority to transcend their ethnic origins: for example Mahatma Gandhi in the Indian sub-continent or President Tito in Yugoslavia. It can also be managed by someone who can claim a connection with all the major ethnic groups: for example Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone. Arbitration can also be performed by institutions. In Canada, the federal government often arbitrates conflicts between provincial governments and local minorities. The Canadian Supreme Court judges disputes between the federal and provincial governments, as well as among the latter. Imperial centres often arbitrate conflicts in colonial outposts. One writer attributes increasing national and ethnic conflict in Canada to its final decolonisation and the removal of the imperial arbiter[13]. Finally, internal arbitration can be performed by a

political party. One-party states claim to absorb key members of rival ethnic communities and regulate their rival aspirations. This argument was advanced by Nkrumah in Ghana in the 1960s and Mugabe in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. However, it is empirically difficult to dis-tinguish this (alleged) form of arbitration from hegemonic control. In a competitive political system, by contrast, internal arbitration can be peformed by a pivotal political party, one judged to be sufficiently disinterested by the other contending factions to be able to chair a cross-ethnic coalition. The Alliance Party has long sought to perform this function, without success, in Northern Ireland; and the Indian Congress party has long claimed to be a reasonable arbiter of ethnic conflicts in India's regions, a claim which has become steadily more threadbare in the years since Nehru's death.

External arbitration, by contrast, suggests that national or ethnic conflict cannot be successfully managed within the relevant political system. It is a potentially useful conflict regulating device during processes of decolonisation, where an external force still possesses authority, but less effective when the conflict zone is a strong sovereign state. External arbitration can be performed by a single external agent or state, a bipartisan authority, or a multipartisan force. Multipartisan arbitration, or cooperative internationalisation, as originally envisaged for United Nations' peacekeeping (and peacemaking) forces, has been performed with intermittent success in Cyprus and parts of the Middle East and Africa. This kind of arbitration is usually a sign that the relevant conflict is seen as insoluble and as a dangerous threat to the security of an entire set of states.

Bipartisan arbitration in its fullest form involves two states sharing sovereignty over a disputed territory, in the form of a condominium[14]. It can also involve an agreement by a state to consult with another interested state over how that region's government is conducted, and to grant the external government a role as guardian of an ethnic minority within the relevant region. One example is the Anglo-Irish Agreement between the British and Irish governments, signed in 1985[15]. The Italian and Austrian governments in 1946 came to an agreement over South Tyrol to safeguard the rights of the German-speaking community, although it was not fully implemented until the early 1990s. The Finnish and Swedish governments reached a similar agreement over the Åland islands. Other bilateral agreements between states over contested regions and national minorities existed in inter-war Europe.

From a normative perspective, arbitration is less attractive than accommodation worked out by the protagonists themselves, such as consociationalism or agreed integration or assimilation. Certain forms of external arbitration can be paternalistic, colonial and undemocratic in nature. However, arbitration is very much preferable to the one-sided methods of conflict regulation on offer, such as genocide, coercive assimilation, forced population transfers and hegemonic control; and if

developed constructively, it can be the prelude to an agreed system of conflict regulation. Insufficient intellectual attention has been given to constructive forms of arbitration.

CANTONISATION AND/OR FEDERALISATION

There are two territorial principles of macro-political conflict regulation, cantonisation and federalisation, both of which can be used to manage national and ethnic differences in liberal democratic ways.

Cantonisation might more accurately be designated as 'communisation' after the communes which operate beneath the cantons in Switzerland. It might also be considered synonymous with devolution organised on an ethno-territorial basis. However, we prefer the term cantonisation because, unlike communisation or devolution, it is distinctively associated with the regional management of ethnic differences. Under cantonisation the relevant polyethnic state is subjected to a micro-partition in which political power is devolved to (conceivably very small) political units, each of which enjoys mini-sovereignty. Although it is usual to discuss cantonisation in the context of federalism—as the Swiss paradigm might suggest—the principle of cantonisation is separable, in principle, from formally federal forms of government. Cantonisation is distinguished from mere administrative decentralisation, common in unitary states because it is built upon the recognition of national, ethnic or linguistic difference and allows for asymmetrical relations between different cantons and the central government. The democratic Spanish state, erected after the fall of Franco, which is formally speaking an asymmetrical form of decentralised unitary state, has implemented a relatively successful cantonisation in Catalonia, but not in the Basque country.

Cantonisation often compares favourably as a policy with more full-blooded nationalist options, whether these be integrationist, secessionist or irredentist. Cantonisation is more gradualist in its implications than drastic repartition of state boundaries because it can permit governments the freedom to reverse any experimental initiatives which go badly wrong. The Canadian government seems to be moving towards limited cantonisation. It recently recognised the 'inherent right' of native peoples to self-government 'within the Canadian federation'.

'Pseudo-cantonisation' is also a possible political strategy, where territorial decentralisation of ethnic conflict is used to facilitate or disguise control, and obviously merits the condemnation of liberals and socialists. For example, the South African government established a number of barren 'homelands' for blacks in an unsuccessful attempt to de-legitimise their demands for power at the centre. In Canada, natives have been herded onto often desolate reserves with extremely limited powers of self-government.

Overlapping cantonisation and federalism there exists a grey area of territorial management of ethnic differences which is often found in

conjunction with external arbitration. International agreements between states can entrench the territorial autonomy of certain ethnic communities, even though the 'host state' does not generally organise itself along either cantonist or federalist principles: for example, the agreement referred to above between Italy and Austria guaranteeing the autonomy of South Tyrol, and the agreement between Finland and Sweden guaranteeing the autonomy of the Åland islands.

Federalism is similar but not coterminous with cantonisation as a device for regulating polyethnic states. In a federation the states, or provinces are usually much larger than cantons, and usually enjoy identical powers. Furthermore, federal constitutions entrench divisions of power between the central and provincial governments. Federalists maintain that if the boundaries between the components of the federation match the boundaries between the relevant ethnic, religious or linguistic communities, i.e. if there is a 'federal society', then federalism can be an effective conflict-regulating device. In the cases of Belgium, Canada and Switzerland, the success of federalism in conflict regulation, such as it is, is based upon the historic accident that the relevant ethnic communities are reasonably geographically segregated. Federalism is less successful for communities which, because of their geographical dispersal or paucity of numbers, cannot control federal units, as with Quebec Anglophones, Francophones outside Quebec, Flemish-speakers in Wallonia, Francophones in Flanders, blacks in the USA and indigenous peoples in Australia and North America. One reason why federalism proved totally insufficient as a conflict regulating device in Yugoslavia was because there was insufficient geographical clustering of the relevant ethnic communities.

Geographically clustered ethnic communities chose multi-ethnic federations for a variety of reasons. They have often evolved out of multi-ethnic colonies, where secession might have provoked conflict with those who wanted to keep the polity unified. Even if a history of common colonial government did not promote any overarching cultural loyalties, it sometimes created elites (soldiers, bureaucrats and capitalists) with an interest in sustaining the existing regime's territory. Moreover, federal states can often be sold economically—they promise a larger internal market, a single currency, economies of scale, reductions in transaction costs and fiscal equalisation. Federal states can also be marketed as geopolitically wise, offering greater security than small states. Finally, the personal philosophies of federation-builders matter: the MacDonald–Cartier alliance and Nehru's leadership were critical in establishing and sustaining the Canadian and Indian federations.

Unfortunately, federalism has a poor track record as a conflict-regulating device in multi-national and polyethnic states, even where it allows a degree of minority self-government. Democratic federations have broken down throughout Asia and Africa, with the possible exception of India—whose survival is partly accounted for by the

degree of central control possible in its quasi-federal system. Federal failures have occurred because minorities continue to be outnumbered at the federal level of government. The resulting frustrations, combined with an already defined boundary and the significant institutional resources flowing from control of their own province or state, provide considerable incentives to attempt secession, which in turn can invite harsh responses from the rest of the federation: the disintegration of the Nigerian and American federations were halted only through millions of deaths, although the break-up of the Czecho-Slovak federation has been peaceful so far. As the ingenious federal engineering of the Nigerian second republic went down before a military coup the jury must remain out on the success or otherwise of democratic federalism in resolving Nigeria's ethnic dilemmas. India, the most successful post-colonial federation, faces secessionist movements in Kashmir and Punjab, and Canada is perennially threatened with the secession of Quebec (although this, like Godot, never comes). Even the sham federations of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia provided various ethnic movements with the resources to launch successful secessions during 1991–2. Integrationist nation-builders in Africa have distrusted federalism precisely for this reason. Federations have been especially fragile in bi-ethnic societies, as the partition of Czecho-Slovakia underlines. With the possible exception of Belgium, there is not a single case of successful federalism based upon dyadic or two-unit structures. Even the Belgian federation technically has four sub-units, even if it is built around a dualist ethnic division, and the EC has helped sustain the unity of Belgium. Even relatively successful multi-ethnic federations appear to be in permanent constitutional crises. Not only do the division of powers need to be constantly renegotiated as a result of technological advances, economic transformations and judicial interventions, but supplemental consociational practices are often required at the federal and sub-central levels of government to maintain stability.

However, despite the difficulties associated with it, genuine democratic federalism is clearly an attractive way to regulate national and ethnic conflict, with obvious moral advantages over pure control. The argument that it should be condemned because it leads to secession and civil war can be sustained only in three circumstances: first, if without federalism there would be no secessionist bid *and*, second, if it can be shown that national or ethnic conflict can be justly and consensually managed by alternative democratic means; and third, if the secessionist unit is likely to exercise hegemonic control (or worse) of its indigenous minorities.

CONSOCIATION OR POWER-SHARING

Political relationships can be organised between ethnic communities to prevent conflict according to power-sharing or consociational principles. These principles can operate at the level of an entire state, or

within a region of a state characterized by ethnic conflict: they are relevant to both central and local governments. Consociational systems operated in the Netherlands from 1917 through till the 1960s, in Lebanon between 1943 and 1975, and in Canada from the 1840s to the 1860s. Malaysian politicians experimented with consociationalism between 1955 and 1969, Fijians on and off between 1970 and 1987, and Northern Irish politicans for a brief spell in 1974.

Consociational democracies usually have four features[16]: *a grand coalition government* which incorporates the political parties representing the main segments of the divided society; *proportionality* rules which apply throughout the public sector; *community autonomy* which enables self-government in those domains of most profound concern to ethnic communities; and minority *veto rights* on constitutional change. Consociational principles are based upon the acceptance of national and ethnic pluralism. They aim to secure the rights and identities of all communities, and to create political and other social institutions which enable them to enjoy the benefits of equality without forced assimilation. In some zones of conflict the relevant populations effectively have the choice of creating consociational democratic institutions or having no meaningful democratic institutions at all.

Not all consociational experiments prove successful, as the cases of Cyprus and Northern Ireland indicate, but some of them have been. The best normative case for consociational arrangements is that they involve the self-government of the relevant communities, and that they are better than the alternatives: majority-domination, bloody partition, secessionist warfare or the unthinkable options of forced population-transfers and genocide. However, consociational conflict-regulation is easily destabilised. To work, consociational systems require at least three fundamental supports. First, the rival communities must not be unreservedly committed to immediate or medium-term integration or assimilation of others into 'their' nation or to the creation of their own nation-state. Nationality conflicts appear to have an irreducibly zero-sum character because most nationalists are wedded to the dogma of indivisible sovereignty. In consociations, the task of preventing ethnic communities from developing full-scale and exclusive national consciousness requires political elites either to downplay the state's national identity in a world in which the pressures to do the opposite are very powerful, or to develop an artificial and transcendent national identity, which may prove very difficult. Second, successive generations of political leaders must be motivated to engage in conflict regulation and sustain the consociational system. The leaders of the rival ethnic communities must fear the consequences of protracted ethnic war and desire to preserve the economic and political stability of their regions. Third, the political leaders of the relevant ethnic communities must enjoy political autonomy, so that they can make compromises without being accused of treachery; and they can only enjoy such autonomy

where there is not extensive intra-ethnic competition as to who best represents the interests of the community. This condition is most exacting as the dangerous phenomenon of 'outflanking', whereby moderates are outbid by ethnic or national extremists, is latent in all ethnically-divided societies.

These are demanding requirements. If they are not present, as in the Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Malaysia, Cyprus and Fiji, then consociational experiments break down. An even more depressing conclusion is that consociationalism may only be practicable in moderately rather than deeply divided societies[17]. This conclusion is not appetising for enthusiasts of consociationalism in Burundi, Fiji, Northern Ireland, Malaysia, Lebanon and South Africa.

We cannot explore here the full range of variations which can be detected within each of our eight categories, and have only discussed a small sample of how these methods have been employed in practice. We have also not considered micro-scale policies for regulating national and ethnic conflict, such as specific electoral systems, programmes of affirmative action, anti-discrimination law or community-relations initiatives. These tasks require a book-length study, on which we are presently engaged. However, we hope this article provides a useful classification which enables readers to make sense of the multiplicity of ways in which national and ethnic conflicts are being—or might be—regulated on a macro-scale. It should assist students to think through the feasibility of various proposals currently being considered, or implemented, to resolve conflicts in various parts of the world. Our argument is aimed at promoting debate about the morality of certain projects, especially the facile assumption that integration (or assimilation) is the only democratically 'politically correct' strategy when confronted with national and ethnic conflict, and stimulating research on explanations of when given strategies are likely to succeed. In any case, national and ethnic conflict regulation is much too important to be left to nationalist or ethnic partisans.

1   Conceptual disagreement on genocide revolves around six issues. (1) Debate exists over whether the UN definition is too inclusive. Sub-clause (b) of Article II refers to 'serious . . . mental harm' which enables too many affronted communities to claim they are the victims of genocide, which arguably detracts attention from more grievous phenomena. Should the affront that some Muslims claim to feel about the publication of *The Satanic Verses* enable them to construe it as an act of genocide? (2) Some argue that the UN definition is too exclusive because it does not include the killing of persons for their real or alleged social class position. They think 'genocide' should cover any large-scale planned annihilation of any group. While we are here concerned with the killing of national or ethnic as opposed to political and class groups, no moral distinction should be made between these killings. All of them should be considered genocide in international law. However, we accept the analytical merit of distinguishing genocide (the killing of a national or ethnic or religious or racial community) from *politicide* (mass killings of people for their political beliefs). (3) Some believe that the UN definition of genocide should explicitly include the destruction of a community's culture. Clearly where mass killings on national, ethnic, racial or religious criteria lead to the destruction of a community's culture

then the latter is a consequence of genocide, but it is another matter to define the direct or indirect destruction of a culture as genocide. We do not think genocide should be conceptually stretched, as its originator Lemkin suggested, to include 'ethnocide' or 'peacetime genocide', i.e. the destruction of a culture without mass killings—see F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn (eds) *The History and Sociology of Genocide* Yale University Press, 1990, p 9. The destruction of a culture while entirely meriting condemnation is best considered as a coercive form of assimilation, and is discussed as such below. (4) There are some difficulties in assuming that national, ethnic, racial and religious killings are of the same kind, when there may be obvious differences in motivation and consequence, but the terms natio-cide, ethno-cide, racial-cide and religio-cide would not be very elegant. (5) Many moral philosophers argue that killing of civilians by aerial bombardments should be considered genocidal. It is a moot point as to whether there are meaningful differences between the killing of civilians during aerial bombardments and the commission of genocide. Bombardment of civilians is thoroughly reprehensible, but the intention behind it is usually limited to weakening the enemy's war-machine and winning a conflict rather than destroying a defenceless population. Foreign populations, living in states which they control, are also usually capable of offering some substantial defence which differentiates their plight from those subjected to territorial control by genocidal agents. In the latter case, the victims are relatively defenceless; the motive cannot be to end a war, as either no conflict has taken place or it has already been won; and it is such killings which are properly described as genocidal. (6) Finally, genocide is a deliberate act and should not, in our opinion, describe unintentional killings, what Dadrian calls 'latent genocide', like the accidental deaths which results from the introduction of foreign diseases—see F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn, op. cit., p. 14. However, where mass deaths are the known indirect consequence of deliberate acts (as when slaughtering the livestock of nomads leads to large-scale famine) these actions may be appropriately described as genocidal.

2   See E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Basil Blackwell, 1983, p. 105.
3   I. Jennings, *The Approach to Self Government*, Cambridge University Press, 1956, p. 56.
4   D. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, University of California Press, 1985, pp. 229ff.
5   The way in which we contrast integration and assimilation is not the same as that found in the confused literature on the subject. For example, Ian Bremner and Ray Taras, in their otherwise useful edited collection, regard integration as 'a slow process' and assimilation as a faster attempt by the central government to make non-central communities an immediate part of the national culture (*Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 15). This contrast in time differences is the exact opposite of what we would expect: other things being equal, integration is a far more tractable ambition than assimilation, so one would expect that assimilation will generally take longer than integration. For example, for the foreseeable future the integration of peoples into a European Union is far more likely than their assimilation.
6   See S. J. R. Noel, 'Canadian Responses to Ethnic Conflict: Consociationalism, Federalism and Control' in J. McGarry and B. O'Leary (eds), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation: Cases Studies of Protracted Ethnic Conflicts*, Routledge, 1993, p. 59.
7   D. Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 567–8.
8   See for example W. Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community and Culture*, Oxford University Press, 1991.
9   H. Roberts, 'Sound Stupidity: The British Party System and the Northern Ireland Question' in J. McGarry and B. O'Leary (eds.), *The Future of Northern Ireland*, Clarendon Press, 1990, p. 132.
10 Coopting elites as a technique for monopolising power should be distinguished from offering to share power—the former is characteristic of control, the latter of consociationalism. Some leaders of the ANC believe that the South African government is giving them the former under the guise of offering them the latter.
11 See B. O'Leary and J. McGarry, *The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland*, Athlone Press, 1993, pp. 107–180.
12 I. Lustick, 'Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control', *World Politics*, 1979, 31, pp. 325–44.
13 S. Scorsone, 'Canadians are Orphans of Empire', *Toronto Star*, 28.12.1992.
14 We have argued that a democratised condominium is the most feasible and desirable way of regulating conflict over and in Northern Ireland (O'Leary and McGarry, op.cit., chapter 8).
15 For a discussion of the Anglo-Irish Agreement see O'Leary and McGarry, op.cit., pp. 220–41.
16 A. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, Yale University Press, 1977.
17 D. Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 571–2.